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FEDERALISM AND OBSCENITY
Robert M. O'Neil
It is not known how conscious sellers of erotic publications are of the
current state of the law. But if Jerry Lee Smith had had accurate legal
information in the summer of 1974 when he mailed several magazines and
films from Des Moines to people who had ordered them in other parts of
Iowa, he would have thought he was beyond the reach of the criminal law.
Earlier that year the Iowa legislature had amended the state's obscenity
law' - following a recommendation of the President's Commission on
Obscenity and Pornography' - to eliminate penalties for dissemination to
adults and to retain only those sanctions designed to shield minors.3 After
the effective date- of this new law, Smith clearly could not have been
prosecuted in the state courts for an obscenity offense.
Federal authorities, however, took a different view of Smith's activities.
Postmasters in several Iowa communities to which the publications had
been mailed withdrew them upon arrival and returned them to the sender,
while giving the relevant information to the United States Attorney.
Smith was then tried and convicted in the federal district court, despite his
claim that the new Iowa law excused him from federal as well as state
sanctions. The Court of Appeals affirmed,4 and the Supreme Court by a 5-
4 margin in Smith v. United States5 held that the jury had properly
followed its own view of "community standards" and was not constrained
by the more lenient terms of the Iowa statute. The majority reached two
conclusions of central importance: one, that the state legislature could not
"freeze a jury" in the application of community standards to allegedly
6obscene material; the other, that in any event state law was irrelevant in a
federal prosecution where the substantive standards were shaped by federal
* Vice President-Bloomington and Professor of Law, Indiana University. A.B. 1956,
A.M. 1957, LL.B., 1961, Harvard University.
I. IOWA CODE § 725 (1975).
2. COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY, REPORT 53(1970).
3. 1974 Iowa Acts ch. 1267, 1268, at 977.
4. The per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals was not reported; indeed the court
directed that its opinion not be printed or published. It appears in Smith v. United States, 431
U.S. 291,43-46 app. (1977).
5. 431 U.S. 291 (1977).
6. Id. at 302.
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law.7  The majority also rejected Smith's claim that prosoective jurors
should have been allowed to answer questions about their understanding of
"community standards."'  Four Justices dissented - three (Brennan,
Stewart and Marshall) in a brief opinion restating their earlier views that
the federal postal-obscenity law was constitutionally overbroad. 9 Justice
Stevens expressed his dissenting views at greater length, l° reviewing
critically the process by which the Court had handled the obscenity issue
since its 1973 decision in Miller v. California.''
The Smith case poses several questions, some special to obscenity law,
and others central to the role which state law plays in the federal courts.
This article will concentrate on the federalism aspect of Smith, although a
concluding section will summarize briefly the major implications of the
case for obscenity and first amendment law.
I. Smith, SMUT, AND FEDERALISM
To place the federal-state relationship issue in context, we must
understand the condition at the time of the trial of a "triangle" of law, that
is, the intersection of three separate bodies of law: federal statutory law,
constitutional case law, and state statutory law. Earliest of these was the
1883 federal statute which makes it a crime, among other acts, to use the
mails for the sending of "every obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or
vile article, matter, thing, device, or substance."' 2  Congress has never
defined the operative terms, including "obscene"; it has simply been
assumed by the courts that definitions were a matter of federal law. In the
early cases federal judges turned to legal dictionaries and like sources, for
elaborations of the meaning of "obscene" and the several other terms."
As a result, the definitions were quite broad and imprecise; phrases such as
7. Id. at 303-05.
8. Id. at 308.
9. Id. at 310-11.
10. Id. at 311-21.
II. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1970).
13. E.g., United States v. Males, 51 F.41 (D. Ind. 1892); United States v. Martin, 50 F.
918 (W.D. Va. 1892). For evidence of the transition to more modern and more precise
standards, see United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses", 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933),
a/f'd, 72 F. 2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934); United States v. Kennerley, 209 F. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1913). See
generally J. PAUL & M. SCHWARTZ, FEDERAL CENSORSHIP: OBSCENITY IN THE MAIL (1961);
Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional Standards,
45 MINN. L. REV. 5 (1960).
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"tend[ency] to deprave morals" or "offensive to chastity and modesty"
appeared in the earlier cases. 14 It was not, in fact, until 1957 in Roth v.
United States 5 that the Supreme Court intervened in the definitional
process. Roth arose under the postal-obscenity statute and therefore
provided long needed guidance on the substantive standard. The case was
significant not only for the definition it offered, but for the Court's attempt
to articulate a uniform national standard which would govern state as well
as federal obscenity cases. The commitment to a national standard was, of
course, strongly reaffirmed in the mid 1960's with the adoption of the "hard
core" test - the requirement that material to be found obscene must be
shown to be "utterly without redeeming social value."' 6
Then in 1973 the course of decision was suddenly reversed; in Miller v.
California,7 the new majority of the Court abandoned the quest for a
single national standard, and held that juries must apply essentially local
standards. One element of the new formula replaced the "utterly lacking"
test with the inquiry "whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."' 8 In order to find a work
obscene, the jury must decide "whether the average person, applying
.contemporary community standards would find that the work . . . ap-
peals to the prurient interest . . . [and] . .. whether the work depicts or
describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined
by the applicable state law."' 9
The possible role of state law in federal cases had never been seriously
considered until this time. Miller did, h6wever, at least invite speculation
about a new dimension of federalism in the obscenity field; since juries were
to apply a standard which had less than nationwide scope, the role of the
state legislature had now to be assessed. Miller, to be sure, was a state case,
and the effect of the new test in the federal courts remained uncertain. The
next year the Court reviewed a federal postal conviction in Hamling v.
United States2 0 which held that the jury's function was no less in the federal
14. See, e.g., Dunlop v. United States, 165 U.S. 486, 501, 502 (1897); United States v.
Dennett, 39 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1930).
15. 354U.S.476(1957).
16. A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney
Gen., 383 U.S. 413,418 (1966).
17. 413 U.S. 15(1973).
18. Id. at 24.
19. id. See generall Note, Communit, Standards, Class Actions, and Obscenit'
,
Under Miller v. California, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1838 (1975) (a recent review of Miller and its
impact on the fact-finding process).
20. 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
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courts than in state obscenity cases and which marked as the appropriate
"community standard" that of the federal judicial district from which the
jury was selected. Despite the greater deference now paid to the jury in the
definitional process, and the absence of a single national standard, the
Court reaffirmed its earlier judgment that the federal postal-obscenity law
was not excessively vague or overbroad. 2' Hamling failed, however, to
clarify the role that state law might play in a federal prosecution.
This discussion brings us back to the third leg of the triangle in Smith -
the unusual posture of the Iowa law at the time of the mailings charged in
the federal prosecution. Until 1974, Iowa's obscenity statute was like that
of most other states; it forbade the dissemination of obscene materials to
adults as well as to minors. 22  After this law was struck down by the state
courts in a post-Miller case,23 however, the Iowa General Assembly took
the bold step of decriminalizing distribution of obscenity to adults,
14
retaining only the ban on sales to minors.
Though the Iowa legislature eventually took back its bold step, 2 ' during
the life of the 1974 revision a person could not have been convicted in the
state courts for the acts charged against Smith in the federal indictment.
There was no claim that any mailings had been made to or even seen by
minors; all the acts charged in fact involved adults who had specifically
requested the publications. The possible relevance of the Iowa law to the
federal case was enhanced by the wholly intrastate character of the
21. Id.atI14.
22. IOWA CODE §§ 725.5, 725.6 (1973).
23. State v. Wedelstedt, 213 N.W.2d 652 (Iowa 1973); see also State ex re/. Faches v.
N.D.D., Inc., 228 N.W.2d 191 (Iowa 1975).
24. 1974 Iowa Acts ch. 1267, 1268, at 977. For similar steps taken by several other
states, see, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 9.68.060 (Supp. 1974); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 944.25 (West
Cum. Supp. 1975). Such a limitation was, in fact, suggested by the plurality of the Supreme
Court as long ago as Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964), where Mr. Justice Brennan
observed: "State and local authorities might well consider whether their objectives in this area
would be better served by laws aimed specifically at preventing distribution of objectionable
material to children, rather than at totally prohibiting its dissemination." Id. at 195. Also in
the background, of course. is Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). in which the Court
upheld a state statute which imposed stricter standards on the determination of obscenity of
materials distributed to minors. On the other hand, the Court has never repudiated Butler v.
Michigan. 352 U.S. 380 (1957), in which the majority warned that selective laws or
enforcement could not "reduce the adult population of Michigan to reading only what is fit for
children." 352 U.S. at 383. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAi LAW, 662 n.44, 663
n.49 (1978).
25. As of I January 1978, sales to adults were once again proscribed, though under a
narrower definition of"sexual conduct" than that contained in the pre- 1974 law. IOWACODE
§ 2804 (1978).
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mailings. Thus a pure test was presented of the role of state law which
defined forbidden conduct more narrowly than did the general provisions
of the United States Code.
To this point we have assumed "the relevance of state law" through a
single channel. It would be instructive at this point to identify several quite
different roles which the Iowa law might have played in a federal prosecu-
tion.26 At the far end of the scale, one could argue that a federal indictment
charging intrastate acts exempt from state law should simply be dismissed.
A less drastic approach would be to allow the case to go to the jury, but
under instructions governed by the Iowa statute; thus if the jury found the
defendant guilty without evidence of sales to minors, such a verdict must be
set aside. A third possibility would be to instruct the jury on the basis of the
state law - that is, telling them that Smith's conduct was definitely not in
violation of the Iowa statute - but nonetheless to allow a conviction to
stand if the jury chose to disregard the state law. A fourth approach, one
for which the defendant argued early in the trial, would permit defense
counsel to question prospective jurors on their understanding of the
current Iowa law, as well as their general awareness of contemporary
community standards; such questions would not have given the statute
dispositive force but would at least have allowed it to shape the selection of
the jury.
Two possible options remain. A fifth would be for the trial court to
insist that the Iowa law be introduced as evidence of the "contemporary
community standards" which the jury must apply, but without precluding
recourse to other sources. The sixth and final approach -the one actually
taken in the Smith trial - would be to allow the statute to be introduced
into evidence, but without attributing to it any special legal significance.
In this instance, the prosecution simply submitted the materials, without
any evidence bearing on community standards; the judge instructed the
jury to "draw on your own knowledge of the views of the average person in
the community" - a charge which invited jurors to give the statute as much
or as little weight as they wished.
The question now before us, as before the Supreme Court, is whether
the Iowa statute should have received a greater degree of deference - that
is, whether any of the first five options outlined above should have been
applied. We may concede that a federal court would not dismiss an
26. Fora more general discussion of this issue, see P. BATOR, D. SHAPIRO. P. MISHKIN, &
H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1262-
73 (2d ed. 1973), [hereinafter cited as HART AND WECHSLER].
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otherwise valid prosecution simply because the same case could not have
been brought in the state courts. But there are less drastic ways in which
the state and federal law might have been reconciled. The question here,
therefore, is not which of the rejected options should have been adopted,
but only whether any of them would better have maintained the balance
between two dissonant bodies of law than the option actually selected by
the district court and ultimately approved by the Supreme Court. We
simply ask whether the Iowa statute was entitled to something more than a
casual evidentiary role in the federal prosecution.
To pose the dilemma of the Smith case more broadly, we might begin
with two general propositions. The first is that states lack the power under
our federal system to decriminalize conduct which federal law proscribes.
The other proposition is that there exists a federal interest in protecting
the morals of citizens of a state whose lawmakers have declared that such
morals do not need such protection. This is at best tenuous, although the
federal power to grant such protection may indeed exist. Both proposi-
tions must be developed more fully to understand the central dilemma of
the Smith case.
On the one hand, it is elementary that a state cannot prevent the federal
government from punishing conduct by declaring that such conduct does
not violate state law. If federal power exists under the Constitution, that
power may be exercised, even with regard to wholly intrastate activities,
27notwithstanding any views of the state legislature to the contrary. What
is true in volatile areas such as school desegregation or civil rights must be
equally true for such matters of lesser majesty as the use of the mails for
purposes which Congress has deemed inimical to the interests of the United
States. Congress has plenary power over the mails - not only to protect
but also to exclude and, as it turns out, to censor on content grounds as
well.
28
The second proposition seems difficult to reconcile with the first.
Granting that plenary federal power over the mails does exist, the
application of that power to the field of obscenity raises special questions.
27. E.g., Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962); cf. McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115
(1913). (State legislation cannot impair legislative means provided by Congress in the
Federal Pure Food and Drugs Act for the enforcement thereof).
28. See, e.g.. Electric Bond & Share Co. v. SEC. 303 U.S. 419, 442 (1938); Exparte
Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 736-37 (1878) (affirming power of Congress to exclude lottery materials
from the mails); L. TRIBE, supra note 24, at 252-53. But cf Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381
U.S. 301 (1965) (limitations on congressional authority).
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Some postal laws are clearly designed to protect the mails, 29 and thus
serve, as Professor Louis B. Schwartz long ago defined the functions of
federal criminal law, "to punish anti-social conduct of distinctively, if not
exclusively, federal concern.",30 But the laws which bar the use of the mails
to send obscene matter fall under the second of Professor Schwartz's
categories - "to punish conduct of local concern, with which local
enforcement authorities are unable or unwilling to cope."3  Typically,
federal sanctions of the second type reinforce local law enforcement
activity, and concurrent jurisdiction is thus welcomed by the states and
localities.32 There may be questions about the propriety of punishing a
person twice for a single act which violates both federal and state law, and
we shall look more carefully at that issue in a later section.33  Here,
however, we are concerned with the anomalous situation in which the
lawmakers of a state have declared that they do not wish certain conduct to
be criminal, and federal authorities have proceeded to prosecute it none-
theless. Ordinarily, such a dissonance of objectives should simply be
worked out through the political process, since the possibility of discord
between federal and state prosecutors inheres in our federal system.
There is a strong argument, however, that the resolution should be
different in the case of obscenity. For some time there have been
reservations about the distinctively federal interest in punishing the
distribution of obscene materials. Twenty years ago Mr. Justice Harlan
declined to affirm the postal-violation conviction in Roth, and expressed
his doubts about the federal role in this field: "Not only is the federal
interest in protecting the Nation against pornography attenuated, but the
29. 18 U.S.C. § 1691 et. seq., e.g., provides penalties for offenses relating to postal service
such as obstruction of mails, theft of or injury to postal equipment, avoidance of postage fees,
etc.
30. Schwartz, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction and Prosecutors' Discretion, 13 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 64. 66 (1948).
31. Id. Professor Schwartz later observes:
To enlist the federal power in the battle against obscenity, lotteries, theft,
alcoholism, and prostitution is not to protect federal prestige, but to hazard it; it
does not solve federal administrative problems but creates new ones; it does not
vindicate federal authority in matters of distinctively national concern against
possible local obstruction, but steps into local issues. Federal intervention also has
a tendency to weaken the enforcement efforts of state authorities.
Id. at 70.
32. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (federal offense to rob any member bank of the Federal
Reserve System).
33. See notes 66-74 infra and accompanying text.
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dangers of federal censorship in this field are far greater than anything the
States may do;3 4 the Federal Government has no business, whether under
the postal or commerce power, to bar the sale of books because they might
lead to any kind of'thoughts.' ""
As though in partial response to Justice Harlan's doubts, the Burger
Court in 1973 did abandon the quest for a single national standard of
36obscenity in favor of local judgments. More significant, however, than
Miller's "anti-nationalism" may have been the positive character of its
"localism." The interests to be protected by leaving the judgment of
obscenity to juries chosen from the community are, of course, those of
states and localities, since there is no longer an identifiable national set of
interests. On several occasions in the recent cases, the Court has recog-
nized that "the States have considerable latitude in framing ... 'contem-
porary community standards.' "" Indeed, the Court has explicitly recog-
nized that some states may wish less protection than the Constitution (as
interpreted in Miller) would allow, just as others may wish to take their
laws to the limit: "The States, of course, may follow such a 'laissez-faire'
policy and drop all controls on commercialized obscenity, if that is what
they prefer. " " There is thus the basis of an argument that states were
expressly invited to do just what Iowa did in 1974, with an expectation that
federal agencies would respect the state's definition of its protectable
interests.
If the interests being protected through the obscenity laws are indeed
the morals and values of the state, and if the lawmakers of that state decide
that adults no longer need such protection, a federal prosecution for wholly
intrastate sales becomes at least anomalous. Professor Schauer, in
his recent reatise on the law of obscenity, observes:
If the state law of. the relevant community does not make obscenity a
crime, or perhaps only includes minors, then the law, theoretically
embodying the wishes of the community, should be probative as to the
standards of the community. If the community does not make the
activity a crime, it can be said that it does not offend the community.3 9
34. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 505 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring and
dissenting).
35. id. at 507.
36. Millerv. California, 413 U.S. 15(1973).
37. Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 157 (1974).
38. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 64 (1973). Fora pre- Miller suggestion
to the same effect, see United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 357 (1971).
39. F. SCHtAUER. TmE LAW OF OBSCENITY 134 (1976). For the suggestion that the
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A paradox thus clearly emerges from these two basic propositions;
namely, though a state may not simply stay the operation of federal law
simply by narrowing its own criminal sanctions, a complete disregard of
the Iowa statute in a federal prosecution for intrastate mailings to adults
seems inconsistent with the Supreme Court's growing deference in obsceni-
ty cases to local values, mores, and interests. The difficulty is to identify
principles of federal-state relations which will provide a better accommo-
dation than the Smith decision itself provided. Several analogies may be
helpful, although none is perfect. First, we will examine principles of
federal preemption, or the status of state law under the Supremacy Clause
in areas of shared responsibility. A second, possibly apposite, inquiry is
the role that state law plays in federal court proceedings, whether incorpo-
rated by express reference, or adopted through judicial discretion to fill
gaps in the federal body of law. A third concept which may offer some
guidance is that of successive prosecutions, under state and federal law, for
a single act which violates both.
A. Federal Preemption of State Law
We begin with the subject of federal preemption and the Supremacy
Clause, since this is the most familiar of the analogies. Through a long and
not always consistent line of cases, the Supreme Court has held that federal
law preempts or displaces-state law in the absence of a clear expression of
Congressional intent to the contrary only to the extent of an actual conflict
between the two bodies of law, or where the subject matter by its nature
requires a uniform national standard, or where the operation of federal law
(or the achievement of a strong federal policy) would be threatened by the
coexistence of both laws.4 0 The cases of direct conflict are quite rare.
Most preemption decisions turn either on evidence of Congressional in-
tent to occupy the field, or a judgment that the need for uniformity or the
strength of a national interest requires state law to yield.4'
None of the factors mandating preemption seems remotely present in
the obscenity area. While regulation of imports from foreign countries
Supreme Court's deference to community standards in the obscenity area is consistent with a
broader deference to state and local standard-setting and regulation, see Developments in the
Law, Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1180-81 (1977).
40. E.g., Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977): City of Burbank v. Lockheed
Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624 (1973): Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul. 373 U.S. 132
(1963): L. TRIBE, supra note 24, at 376-91.
41. E.g., Campbell v. H ussey, 368 U.S. 297 (1961); see generall' Note. Pre-emption as a
Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Construction, 12 STAN. L. REV. 208 (1959).
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may require exclusive federal control,42 the same cannot be said of
dissemination through the domestic mails.4 3  Some states in fact have in
their own laws provisions paralleling the federal postal obscenity ban,44
and the concurrent application of such laws has never seriously been
questioned. The recent Supreme Court decisions have, if anything, more
clearly foreclosed any possible preemption claim; the abandonment of any
possible national standard of obscenity, and the preference for local juries
defining community standards, surely argue against exclusive federal
superintendence.
The ease with which we conclude that power is shared does not,
however, make preemption law meaningless. Certainly the federal postal
obscenity statutes do not prevent Iowa from enacting its own parallel or
concurrent laws. Nor, as the Supreme Court has recently said, do the
federal laws prevent Iowa from adopting a more lenient attitude toward
obscenity. But the issue is not whether state law is free to function in the
state courts, but the more difficult question whether the state definition of
obscenity plays any role in federal prosecutions. A finding of non-
preemption may help, but only slightly. The question here is not the one
we would have if, for example, Congress defined obscenity one way and the
Iowa legislature defined it differently; under the recent Supreme Court
cases a jury of Iowa citizens in a federal prosecution for intrastate mailings
would be free to adopt the state definition rather than the federal one. The
Smith jury could certainly have acquitted had they shared the legislative
view that only minors needed protection from obscenity. The trouble was
that Iowa jurors held a more restrictive view than that of their elected
lawmakers, and thus reached a verdict they would not have been allowed to
reach in a state court. Thus our conclusion that Iowa's more lenient law is
not preempted means only that jurors (and presumably the district judge)
could have used it as the source on community standards, but not that they
were constitutionally required to do so. 5
42. Cf Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); (state statutes denying welfare
benefits to resident aliens encroach upon exclusive federal power over the entrance and
residence of aliens); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (state's power to regulate aliens
as a distinct group is subject to the national legislative and treaty-making powers).
43. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 30, at 70.
44. E.g., DEL. CODE tit. xi § 1361 (Supp. 1977); VA. CODE § 18.2-374 (1975).
45. This conclusion with regard to federal-state relations in the obscenity field does not
affect, or undermine the force of several recent decisions preempting local regulation of
obscenity as a matter of state law. See, e.g.. Whitney v. Municipal Court, 58 Cal. 2d 907,377
P.2d 80, 27 Cal. Rptr. 16 (1962); People v. Llewellyn, 401 Mich. 314, 257 N.W.2d 902 (1977);
Dimor, Inc. v. City of Passaic, 122 N.J. Super. 296, 300 A.2d 191 (1973). The arguments
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B. Incorporation and Borrowing-Choice of State Law
in Federal Proceedings
A second analogy is the broad range of situations in which federal
courts employ state law to fill lacunae in federal law. The most obvious
situation is the doctrine of Erie R. R. v. Thompkins,4 6 which refers many
substantive and some procedural issues to state law in federal civil suits
based on diversity of citizenship. 47  We put these cases aside for obvious
reasons.
Closer to the mark are the various uses of state law in federal question
litigation. Sometimes, as under the Federal Tort Claims Act,48 Congress
has decreed that state law will be used, and the district court has no option.
In other situations, discretion exists whether to fill gaps in federal law by
reference to state law. Several elements have guided this choice - the
strength of the federal interest (as when the United States is a party to the
litigation); the nature of the issue which creates the gap; and the degree to
which the applicable state law would provide a helpful solution. 49 The
"subject matter" test has caused federal courts to look to state law in such
areas as domestic relations, land titles, claims to mineral rights, and the
like.5° On the other hand, such areas as environmental protection and
enforcement of arbitration awards have been felt to require a uniform body
of federal law - even where none existed before, and without regard for
the adequacy of available state law.5
which support such judgments as a matter of state law do not lead to a comparable result at the
federal level, especially after Miller.
46. 304 U.S. 64(1938).
47. For recent comments, see Friendly, In Praise of Erie - And of the New Federal
Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 383 (1964); Mishkin, Some Further Last Words on Erie -
The Thread, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1682(1974).
48. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1970); see Massachusetts Bonding Co. v. United States, 352 U.S.
128, 134 (1956).
49. See Note, Adopting State Law as the Federal Rule of Decision: A Proposed Test, 43
U. CHI. L. REV. 823,832-33 (1976).
50. E.g., De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570(1956) (question of whether an illegitimate
child comes within the term "children" as used in federal statute to be determined by reference
to state law); R.F.C. v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204 (1946) (federal act authorizing state
taxation of governmental property construed as referring to state law for determination of
what is taxable as real property). But cf United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412
U.S. 580 (1973) (federal court, in interpreting federal land acquisition contract, not bound by
retroactively enacted "aberrant or hostile" state laws).
51. E.g., Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) (recognition of federal
common law in federal environmental statutes); Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S.
448 (1957) (substantive law in federal labor arbitration to be fashioned by national labor
policy).
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Among the factors encouraging a choice of state law within the
discretionary zone, a recent note finds especially persuasive "a tradition of
local control over the area of law in which the adoption [of state law]
question arises., 52 Where a disregard of state law by a federal court would
be likely to cause a significant disruption in the scheme of state regulation,
the case for using state law is paramount. 53 Even where such "disruption"
is not threatened, the strength of the state interest and the "tradition of
local control" are typically respected by the federaljudge facing a choice of
law issue.54
The regulation of obscenity seems an especially suitable area for
deference to state law. That judgment does not, however, compel the
district judge to adopt state law, or require that the jury do so. Smith's
claim is not that the jury was improperly charged under a federal common
law standard which did violence to th'e Iowa law, but rather that the jury
was given virtually no substantive guidance from any source. Presumably
if the district judge had found that the Iowa statute embodied an appro-
priate community standard, and instructed the jury to follow it, the
Supreme Court would not have set aside an otherwise valid conviction. But
the judge was not persuaded that the Iowa statute had anything more than
incidental evidentiary value, and the Supreme Court found that judgment
equally supportable.
Most of the cases involving incorporation of state law arise on the civil
side of the federal courts, leaving even less clear the proper standard for
criminal cases. There is at least one type of federal criminal case in which
state law plays a prominent and formally assigned role - the prosecution
under the Assimilated Crimes Act55 of conduct occurring in federal
enclaves. Since there is no general federal criminal law, and since state and
local laws do not oftheir own force apply on military bases, in federal
prisons, post offices, and the like, Congress has chosen to adopt the
criminal law of the state to plug the resulting gap. The Supreme Court has
held that the Assimilated Crimes Act may not be used if the conduct
violates any federal law; in other words, a true gap must exist before state
law can fill it." Moreover, the borrowing process affects the scope of
52. See Note, Adapting State Law, supra note 49, at 842.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 855-56.
55. 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1970); see HART AND WEICHSLER, supra note 26, at 1267.
56. Williams v. United States. 327 U.S. 711 (1946); United States v. Butler, 541 F.2d 730
(8th Cir. 1976); f. Fields v. United States, 438 F.2d 205 (2d Cir. 1971) (not improper for the
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neither body of law, but simply serves to harmonize the sanctions of the
federal enclave with those in the surrounding community.57
The Assimilated Crimes Act may shed two kinds of light on the Smith
case. It does illustrate the anomaly which results from enforcing a federal
standard harsher than that which the state itself applies. Suppose, for
example, that Smith had sold the very same magazines to the very same
consenting adults in the lobby of the Des Moines post office rather than
dropping them into the mail chute. Under the Assimilated Crimes Act,
federal law could not reach the in-person sale since Iowa law did not
proscribe it. There is something perverse, though presumably not uncon-
stitutional, about such a difference in result derived from the seller's choice
of means of dissemination.
The Assimilated Crimes Act may have a second oblique relevance to the
Smith case. When Congress wished to incorporate state law, it clearly
knew how to do so, and has done precisely that on several occasions. One
could argue that a failure to make similar provision in other contexts
implies an intent not to follow state law - although in civil litigation
federal courts have not been deterred by the absence of authorization to
adopt relevant state law.
One very recent case exemplifies the uncertainty of the role of state law
in federal criminal proceedings. In United States v. Craig,5" a member of
the Illinois House of Representatives was indicted in federal court for
racketeering activities in violation of the Hobbs Act.59  He sought to
suppress certain portions of testimony he had given to postal inspectors
and an Assistant United States Attorney, arguing that such statements
were privileged under the speech and debate clause of the federal Constitu-
60 
. 61tion, and under a similar provision of the Illinois State Constitution.
The district court sustained the motion to suppress. A panel of the court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit initially agreed that such a privilege
existed as a matter of federal common law, but reversed the order on the
ground that the privilege had been waived." Several months later the full
Court of Appeals overruled the panel, holding that the only possible basis
federal government to prosecute defendant for shooting with intent to kill under state law
where the federal statute proscribed assaults and the Ohio statute prohibited batteries).
57. Williams v. United States, 327 U.S. 711, 718 (1946).
58. United States v. Craig, 537 F.2d 957 (7th Cir. 1976).
59. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1970).
60. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6.
61. ILL. CoNsT., art. IV, § 12 (1970).
62. United States v. Craig, 528 F.2d 773 (7th Cir. 1976).
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of the legislator's claim was the common law doctrine of official immunity,
which did not in any event extend to criminal liability.6 3 Only ChiefJudge
Fairchild considered the possible relevance of the Illinois state constitu-
tion; he argued that "the constitutional relationship between the states and
the United States requires federal courts to recognize and honor the Speech
or Debate Clause of the Illinois Constitution" 64 - though he agreed with
the panel that any possible privilege had been waived. Even if the
Fairchild view had prevailed, there would still be some doubt about its
value to Smith; the Illinois legislator's claim to a federal-prosecution
defense based on a state constitutional provision seems an unusually
persuasive one, since the provision in question derives from the separation
of powers and the integrity of legislative functions.65 There is, however, a
useful analogy, and an illustration of the still uncertain status of state law in
federal criminal proceedings.
This discussion of the role of state law in the federal courts leads us to
essentially the same conclusion we reached under the preemption heading:
while a federal court might well be guided to a greater degree than in Smith
by more lenient state obscenity law, nothing in the constitution or in
principles of federal-state accommodation seems to require adoption of
state standards. Had the district judge felt the federal obscenity laws
excessively vague after Miller, and wished to give thejury clearer guidance,
he might well have accorded the Iowa statute greater weight. Beyond that,
however, he was not required to go.
C. Dual Sovereignties: The Relationship Between Federal and
State Prosecutions for a Single Offense
A third analogy is suggested by occasional concurrent or consecutive
federal and state prosecutions for a single act in violation of both bodies of
law. Suppose, for example that Smith had been charged in the state court
with selling obscene materials, but was acquitted for any of several possible
63. United States v. Craig, 537 F.2d 957 (7th Cir. 1976).
64. Id. at 959.
65. Cf. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951); Reinstein & Silverglate, Legislative
Privilege and the Separation of Powers, 86 HARV. L. REV. 113 (1973). For a discussion of
the Craig case itself, see Comment, A Speech or Debate Privilege for State Legislators Who
Violate Federal Criminal Laws?, 68 J. CRIM. L. 31 (1977). In a later case, the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit discussed the possible availability of the federal and state
constitutional privilege to a state legislator under investigation by a federal grand jury but
opted in favor of a federal common law privilege. On the facts of the case, the privilege did
not really apply, but the discussion is relevant to the Craig issue. In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 563 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1977).
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reasons (including failure of proof that minors were involved). Suppose
the United States Attorney then sought a new indictment based on the very
same distribution, under the postal obscenity laws. Could Smith assert a
substantial claim of double jeopardy? The answer is probably negative,
although the Supreme Court has not ruled directly on the issue since 1959.
In Abbate v. United States,66 a majority of the Court held that a federal
prosecution was not barred by prior conviction on a similar state charge
growing out of the same conduct. Although earlier cases had stressed
,,67recognition of "two sovereignties, deriving power from different sources,
the Abbate Court emphasized a more practical element - the extent to
which "the efficiency of federal law enforcement must suffer if the Double
Jeopardy Clause prevents successive state and federal prosecutions. 68
The only alternative to successive prosecutions would be some procedurc
by which the Federal Government could preempt (and thus prevent) any
state prosecutions for conduct which might also violate federal law. Such
a procedure would be "highly impractical".69 the Court recognized, leaving
no feasible alternative but the possibility of cumulative trials in different
forums.7 °
The continuing value of the double jeopardy cases and their relevance
are clouded by two factors. One, of course, is the subsequent decision of
the Supreme Court to extend the guarantees of the double jeopardy clause
to the states through the fourteenth amendment.7' For this reason alone,
the Court might well not reach the same result today, at least in the case
where the federal prosecution preceded that of the state for the single
offense.
7 2
The other source of uncertainty is the Court's reluctance to invoke the
old "dual sovereignties" concept of Abbate. Earlier cases spoke majesti-
cally of"[e]ach government in determining what shall be an offense against
its peace and dignity . . . exercising its own sovereignty, not that of the
other."7 3 The Abbate Court did not expressly disavow this concept,
66. 359 U.S. 187(1959).
67. United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922).
68. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 195 (1959).
69. Id. at 195.
70. See also Fisher, Double Jeopardy and Federalism, 50 MINN. L. REV. 607 (1966).
71. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784,(1969).
72. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959) would, underthisview, bedecided differently
today. Bartkus. a companion case to Abbate, held that a state conviction, after a federal
acquittal on substantially the same facts, did not offend fourteenth amendment due process.
73. United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922).
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though its preference for the practical canon of "efficiency" must have been
conscious and meaningful. Thus, one should be cautious about invoking
the "dual sovereignty" concept from the old double jeopardy cases.
Moreover, even a different holding in the rare case of multiple federal and
state prosecutions says relatively little about the extent to which the
standards of one forum should apply in the other. In fact, substantive
standards, procedural rules, sentences, and other dimensions will often
vary as an inevitable consequence of our federal system. Some years ago,
Professor Louis B. Schwartz remarked of the dual criminal law system:
The effect of the choice of forum . . . may mean the difference between
life and death, as under the federal kidnapping statute which authorizes
the death penalty for an offense which in many states is not capital.
Fornication, if criminal at all, is rarely punished by the states. Let the
defendant transport his mistress across the state boundary and he
becomes subject to the five-year penalty of the Mann Act. Similar
differences of treatment depending on the choice between federal and
state prosecution occur in connection with federal legislation against the
mailing of obscene or indecent matter or lottery advertisements. Indeed,
these federal offenses may include some activities entirely lawful under
74
state law .. ..
This review of three possibly relevant areas of federalism yields little of
value to the Smith problem. It is quite true that state obscenity laws
(whether more strict or lenient) are not preempted by the federal statutes,
and are limited only by the first amendment; but that conclusion merely
guarantees to the state law an evidentiary role which the Smith trial judge
in fact gave to the Iowa statute. Much the same is true of the reference-
incorporation issue; the district judge in an obscenity case probably would
be permitted to give greater weight to state obscenity law in his instruc-
tions, but certainly need not do so - and, as we shall see shortly, may not
use such a statute in a'way that preempts the jury's own appraisal of
community standards. Finally, the possibility of federal and state prose-
cutions for a single offense in no way ensures uniformity in the standards or
procedures to be applied. These three areas of accommodation are helpful
to a limited degree, but none suggests that the Smith court was wrong in its
refusal to give greater deference to the Iowa obscenity law.
II. Smith, SMUT, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Even though the Smith decision marks no new departure in federal-
74. Schwartz, supra note 30, at 72.
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state relations, it does contribute several new dimensions to the ever-
changing law of obscenity. The purpose of this concluding section is to
review those implications, and assess the larger impact of the case.
First, the rejection of state law definitions in federal obscenity cases is
significant by itself. Surely the Court's judgment about the irrelevance of
Iowa's decriminalization of adult sales is not limited to the facts. One can
imagine an even stronger case for resort to state law in which the answer
presumably would be the same. For instance, suppose some 90% of the
voters approved a state constitutional amendment not merely suspending
the laws covering consenting adults, but forbidding all regulation of
obscenity. Suppose, as well, that the language of the referendum clearly
revealed a judgment of the citizenry that such conduct should be condoned
and protected. If the somewhat narrower statute involved in Smith was
thought irrelevant, there is little reason to believe that such a state
constitutional amendment would fare better. In a federal prosecution, the
Court has said that thejury makes its own determination of "contemporary
community standards", regardless of views that others in the community
may have expressed at the polls or through their lawmakers.75
If total state decriminalization would not stay the federal prosecutor,
then presumably other provisions of state law - exemption of certain
forms of dissemination, for example, would also be irrelevant. Many state
obscenity laws contain specific exceptions for distribution which serves
educational, scientific, literary or other purposes. These provisions have
given teachers, librarians, and scientific researchers an assurance that their
use and showing of otherwise obscene material for academic purposes
would not risk criminal liability. While the soundness of that confidence is
still unimpaired under state law, the prospect of a federal prosecution now
looms. Thus the librarian should take care in mailing materials which
might be thought obscene, since the dispensation given by state law is good
only in the state courts.
The untying of federal and state law works both ways, of course. If a
defendant in federal court can no longer rely on a state law exemption, he is
also free to seek a common law federal exemption even where state law
would not grant it.7 6 Thus where the state law is unusually rigorous on
75. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973); See Note, Commnunit, Standard, Class
Actions, and Obscenit' under Miller v. California, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1839-46 (1975).
76. See. e.g., Haldeman v. United States, 340 F.2d 59 (10th Cir. 1965): Walker v.
Popenoe. 149 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1945). both of which suggest the possibility of a federal
common law exception to 18 U.S.C. § 1461 for the dissemination through the mails of medical
or scientific works containing material which would be judged obscene in less respectable
contexts.
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matters of obscenity, the federal defendant may actually fare better than he
would have if Smith's position had been accepted by the Supreme Court.
The likelihood of gaining general common law dispensation for educa-
tional, scientific, or literary uses of obscene materials may be remote, but at
least the opportunity exists regardless of blanket prohibitions in state law.
There is one possible caveat about the conclusions under this first
heading. The Supreme Court majority did refer briefly to the uncertain
rationale and unstable condition of the Iowa law, aware that the ban on
sales to adults had already been reinstituted and would become effective six
months after the decision. The Court speculated that Iowa might have felt
in 1974 that prosecutorial time and energy were better spent on other
offenses; or that effort should be concentrated on sales to minors; or that
"the State may have left distribution to consenting adults unregulated
simply because it was not then able to arrive at a compromise statute for
the regulation of obscenity. ' ' 77  Should the referendum hypothesized
earlier be enacted as a clear declaration by the people of a state that certain
conduct should be condoned, and not simply spared from the criminal law
for a brief period, a different and possibly stronger argument could be
made.
A second implication of Smith is that it increases to some degree the
risks of "forum shopping". Since Miller there has been an invitation to
prosecutors to institute "test cases" in parts of the country where convic-
tions seem most probable, with the virtual assurance that success in
Memphis will deter dissemination of a work in Los Angeles, even though
conviction could not have been obtained initially in California."8 The
Smith case gives added significance to the choice between federal and state
court; if the state law is less rigorous, prosecutors who have an option will
undoubtedly move over to the federal courts. Conversely, if the state law
is harsher than the general Miller standards applied in the federal courts,
then anti-obscenity groups would presumably go to the state courts. 79
77. Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291,306(1977).
78. See Morgan, Pornography on Trial: United States Versus the Princes of Porn, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 6, 1977, § VI (Magazine), at 16. Consider the additional problem of the
variability of standards and the choice of law in cases involving several states, analyzed in
Schauer, Obscenit), and the Conflict of Laws, 77 W. VA. L. REV. 377 (1975).
79. It should be noted, however, that since Miller represents a test of constitutionality, a
standard any harsher than this may be subject to constitutional attack. But see Hamling v.
United States, 418 U.S. 87, 103-10 (1974), where the Court recognized that states can
constitutionally proscribe obscenity in terms of a statewide standard, whereas the appropriate
community standard in a federal prosecution may be defined as the federal judicial district
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Technically, a conviction in a federal court establishes only that the
material in question is "nonmailable" and does not totally foreclose its
distribution within the state. But only the hardiest or most heedless person
would rely on the more favorable state law as a source of protection after a
federal court conviction. Thus the choice of forum has great practical
import, whatever may be the theoretical and constitutional differences.
Additionally, the Smith decision greatly enhances the role of thejury in
obscenity prosecutions, in state courts as well as federal. The allocation of
responsibility for standard-setting under the new obscenity doctrine had
not previously been well defined. The 1974 cases did restate Miller's
commitment of deference to the jury, applying in each case its own view of
contemporary community standards. In Jenkins v. Georgia,8 ° the Court
observed that "the States have considerable latitude in framing statutes"
under Miller, but went on to describe that "latitude" in rather limited
terms: "A State may-choose to define an obscenity offense in terms of
'contemporary community standards,' . . . as was done here, or it may
choose to define the standards in more precise geographic terms, as was
done by California in Miller."8' These statements, taken together, left
some doubt about the relative roles of legislators and jurors. Smith
resolved that doubt, quite clearly in favor of the jury: "It would be just as
inappropriate for a legislature to attempt to freeze a jury to one definition
of reasonableness as it would be for a legislature to try to define the
contemporary community standards of appeal to prurient interest or
patent offensiveness, if it were even possible for such a definition to be
formulated., 82 The Court went on to clarify the kind of judgments which a
state legislature might still make - defining the basic conduct and
classifying the offenders to be regulated; defining the geographic area from
which a jury would be chosen-in obscenity cases; and regulating obscenity
indirectly, through the zoning laws. Thus, the opinion concluded, "ample
room is left for state legislation even though the question of the community
standard to apply, when appeal to prurient interest and patent offensive-
ness are considered, is not one that can be defined legislatively.""3
The discussion of legislative authority in Smith was in some sense
from which jurors are drawn to serve in a particular case. Thus it is possible for a state's
Miller standard to be harsher than that of a federal judicial district within that state.
80. 418 U.S. 153 (1974).
81. Id. at 157.
82. Smith v. United States. 431 U.S. 291, 302 (1977).
83. Id. at 303.
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dictum. The Court took the occasion, in reviewing a federal conviction, to
say what state legislatures could and could not do even in state cases. The
delineation of the legislative function was, of course, extremely important
- if only because Miller had held that determination of obscenity reflected,
inter alia, "whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive
way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law. 84
Smith's new contribution was to say that once the legislature had
established basic principles, their application was for the jury, drawing
upon its own notions of community standards in a way that lawmakers
could not preempt. The Court could well have decided Smith as a federal
case without reaching this issue. The fact that the issue was reached may
reveal its importance to the majority of the Court.
There is a special irony about the Court's stress upon the jury's
function. Miller and later cases explained that ajury should be allowed to
apply its own views on obscenity because it brought into the courtroom the
values and mores of the community from which its members were chosen;
the "average person" sitting on the jury was in the best position to know
how the "average persons" in the rest of the community really felt about a
given book, magazine or film.85 Yet the Supreme Court in Smith held that
the defense could not probe the views of prospective jurors on these very
issues - understanding of current community standards, sources of such
views, and information about the position which the legislature and other
bodies had taken on the issue. The Court insisted that "[a] request for the
jurors' description of their understanding of community standards would
have been no more appropriate than a request for a description of the
meaning of 'reasonableness' "" - a disposition which, among other
shortcomings, neglects the critical fact that first amendment interests are at
stake here, as they are not in the typical case where ajury is asked to decide
whether conduct is "reasonable". If, moreover, such questions cannot be
asked on voir dire, then the possibility exists that a highly unrepresentative
body may exercise a function justified by the supposedly representative
character of the jury. Presumably, actual prejudice could be shown on the
part of a particular juror, and challenges for cause based on partiality
have not been foreclosed. But the critical task of selecting the jury
must increasingly be carried out in the dark.
84. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15. 24 (1973) (emphasis added).
85. See Note. Community Standards, supra note 75. at 1845-47.
86. Smith v. United States. 431 U.S. 291, 308(1977).
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Further, Smith has compounded on already serious problem of uncer-
tainty of obscenity standards. Until the Miller case, the uniform national
standard - the "hard-core" or "Fanny Hill""7 test - gave some guidance,
despite its shortcomings. Miller revised the standard, by substituting the
"lacks serious value" language for the more rigorous "utterly without"
phrase.8 " It was not, however, the change in standard that created the
major confusion. Under the arrangement which has evolved since 1973,
each jury becomes essentially its own regulator of obscenity; the substan-
tive standards, as the General Counsel of the American Library Associa-
tion has recently observed, "are not ascertainable until the jurors are
selected".89 The only limits are the very broad ones set by Miller itself; but
even there, if a jury acting under proper instructions finds that the material
before it is lacking in redeeming qualities, that is effectively the end of the
case. To prevail on appeal, the defendant would have to show that as a
matter of law the material was so clearly meritorious that the jury should
not have been allowed to find it otherwise. The progressive blurring of the
standards and the narrowing of ground for appeal go hand in hand, and
together they represent one of the most worrisome features of the obscenity
law in the post-Miller era.
Finally, the task of the prosecutor in such cases has been progressively
attenuated. A work may be submitted by itself, with no evidence of ways
in which its content allegedly violates contemporary community standards
(in terms of current views, expert testimony, availability of comparable
publications, etc.). The practical burden falls on the defendant to establish
that the work has redeeming literary or other value, and if he fails to do so.
the jury is quite likely to convict simply on the basis of its own view of the
work. Moreover, the prosecution is not required to show that anyone was
offended or even affected by the material - even though the premise ol
obscenity legislation has been in part the affront to community values and
mores. Mr. Justice Stevens, dissenting in Smith, pointed out that the
magazines could hardly offend the persons who had ordered them, and thal
"delivery in sealed envelopes prevented any offense to unwilling third
parties." 90 Thus, he concluded, "[s]ince his acts did not even constitute a
87. A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorne
Gen., 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
88. Millerv. California, 413 U.S. 15,24(1973).
89. North. The hnplications.for Librarians. FREEDOM To READ FOUNDATION NEWS
Spring-Summer 1977 at 9.
90. Smithv. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 321 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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iuisance, . . . they cannot provide the basis for a criminal prosecu-
ion."9' To ease further the prosecutor's burden, the requirement of
nowledge or scienter on the defendant's part has been diminished. The
)rosecution apparently need only prove that the material does indeed
ontain representations or descriptions of intercourse, etc., in order to
:onvict for dissemination. The defendant may be presumed to have such
,nowledge, although the presumption is not conclusive.92 Although the
3upreme Court has never abandoned its early insistence on proof of
cienter in obscenity cases, 93 the proof which will meet that requirement
tppears to have steadily lessened.
The Smith case, more on its facts than in the language of the opinions,
onfirms and extends this trend toward a "per se" view of obscenity law. If
he prosecution need only show that certain publications were sent through
he mails by a person who knew they contained certain pictures or words
vithin the Miller definition, then the practical burden of the trial falls very
ieavily indeed on the defendant. The problems of conducting such a
lefense are, of course, compounded by the difficulty of determining in
tdvance of submission what standards the jury may derive from the
ommunity it supposedly represents.
111. CONCLUSION
The Smith case contains several curious and ironic twists. Perhaps the
nost unfortunate of these is the route by which the case reached the
;upreme Court in the first place. Shortly after Smith's conviction in the
ederal district court, the Freedom to Read Foundation of the American
-ibrary Association took over the appeal, and pressed the case through to
he Supreme Court.94  The ALA also filed an amicus curiae brief in the
;upreme Court, arguing broader constitutional grounds for reversal than
hose stressed in the petitioner's brief.95 Had there been full appreciation
91. Id.
92. North, supra note 89, at 9.
93. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959). Shortly after the Smith decision.
3rofessor Kalven wondered whether the vagueness of obscenity, coupled with this rather
trict scienter requirement, might "so bedevil the efforts to prove scienter that the effective
mforcement of regulation against the dissemination of obscene matter [would] collapse at the
)rosecution of the bookseller, the key link in the chain of distribution." Kalven, The
Wletaphysics of the Law of Obscenitr, 1960 SuP. CT. REV. I, 37.
94. See Newsletter on Intellectual Freedom, FREEDOM TO READ FOUNDATION NEWS,
date not available).
95. Amici Curiae Brief of the American Library Association and the Iowa Library
\ssociation. Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 (1977).
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of the possible impact of an adverse decision, those concerned with
freedom of expression and inquiry might have been better advised to let the
case rest at the trial level. But the optimism which ALA and others had al
the outset was certainly well founded. Miller and the 1974 obscenity case,
surely suggested that state law would play an important role. If a state
decided to exempt certain conduct from its obscenity laws, there was
reason to suppose that exemption might also stay the hand of the federal
prosecutor. Thus the decision to press the Smith issue was a wholly
rational and defensible one. The outcome was unfortunate, in ways that
could not have been anticipated. Not only did the Supreme Court fail to
expand the potential role of protective state law in the federal courts, but
actually cast doubts on the potential value of such law in state proceedings.
Perhaps, under these conditions, Smith is an unhappy chapter best
forgotten.
